Sveriges klimat-åtaganden inom EU och internationellt - grova hållpunkter - Umeå Klimatcirkel

Debatt/förslag/argument/fakta på webben, träffar 1-6 av Googling av Political pathways for climate mitigations China, India, Russia

1. On the political feasibility of climate change mitigation pathways: Is it too late to keep warming below 1.5°C? (2019)
   Inte mycket av värde. Teoretisk, akademisk med analysmodell typ avvägning mellan ekonomisk-politisk kostnad kontra kapacitet hos sociala och institutionella aktörer för att genomföra åtgärder för att klara 1,5-gradersmålet. Ger inte några konkreta svar, verkar inte tro att det är feasible (praktiskt genomförbart).
   
   
2. A Balancing Act: China’s Role in Climate Change (pdf 137 sidor, OBS år 2009)
   Sidan 103 ger siffror på uppskattat investeringsbehov om Kina ska öka sin klimatomställningsambition (oklart till vilken ambitionsnivå?):
   
   
   
3. The Response of China India and Brazil to Climate Change (pdf 88 sidor, OBS år 2012)
   These countries make up the BASIC group – a negotiating group in the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In the UNFCCC, the BASIC group’s primary aim is to ensure that they have ‘equitable access to sustainable development’. Their primary concern is poverty-alleviation over emissions reductions.
   In 2009, India, China and Brazil, along with a number of other developing countries, put forward mitigation pledges for the first time. India and China pledged to reduce the emissions intensity of their economies (the amount emitted per unit of GDP) by 20-25% and 40 – 45% by 2020 relative to 2005 levels, respectively. Brazil pledged to reduce its GHG emissions 36.1 – 38.9% below projected emissions by 2020. These were voluntary pledges that have been taken note of under the UNFCCC process.
   
   India is taking action on many fronts to address poverty, natural resource management and climate change mitigation. Progress has been made in the energy sector and the country is now a global leader in renewable energy. The government has been successful in encouraging the operation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the country and is one of the main destinations for CDM projects globally. A carbon tax on coal has also been implemented, the revenues from which go towards funding renewable energy projects. However, there are no plans to phase out fossil fuels in the next 20 years. Greater ambition from India on mitigation is unlikely before 2020.
   
   China is also taking significant action to address climate change at a national level and appears to be serious in meeting its international mitigation pledge. Action on climate change has been embedded in China’s national strategic development policy, the Five-Year Plan (FYP). The most recent FYP, covering the period from 2011 to 2015, includes a number of environmental targets including carbon intensity goals that will put it on the path to meet the UNFCCC pledge. The FYP also addresses a number of other sustainability issues such as pollution, energy efficiency and the percentage of non-fossil fuel sourced energy in the energy mix. China is one of the leaders in the global renewable energy sector; for a number of years China has led world new investment in renewable energy. Despite progress in sustainability over the last few years, the benefits have been marginalised by the negative environmental impacts of rapid economic growth.
   
   While Brazil has made admirable progress in reducing deforestation rates over the previous decade, a controversial bill that would relax Brazil’s Forest Code is expected to be signed into law this year. The most controversial clauses of the bill were vetoed by President Dilma Rousseff. However, environmentalists remain concerned that the gains that Brazil has made in reducing deforestation rates will be reversed. In other sectors, Brazil has been a world leader, particularly in low carbon agriculture and biofuels. However, with the boom of Brazil’s oil and gas industry, its GHG emissions from fossil fuels are projected to increase rapidly. The fact that the Government of Brazil’s own mitigation scenario foresees an increase in emissions from the oil and gas sector of 75% between 2005 and 2020 suggests that this is an area in which the country will not compromise. As a result, after 2020 it is likely that Brazil’s downward trending GHG emission levels will begin to rise.
   
   
   
   
   Despite powerful drivers for action, these three countries are contributing 28% of global GHG emissions and their development plans will result in increasing GHG emissions in the next 2 decades. In the climate negotiations, the focus has shifted from the US to the emerging economies, the BASIC group. The BASIC countries primary aim is to ensure 'equitable access to sustainable development' – i.e. that they are allowed to continue emitting in order to develop to developed country levels. Their push for finance is aimed at supporting other developing countries, their real interest lies in technology transfer (particularly intellectual property rights) as that is what will help their economies the most. The EU-BASIC relationship is most interesting as hope now lies in an EUled alliance with the BASIC group. The US and China are unlikely to increase mitigation ambition without the other signing a legally binding agreement – which they may together decide not to do. The BASIC group is both an opportunity and a threat for South Africa. The four countries are very different but are treated the same in the negotiations. As the junior in the group, South Africa may find itself committing to mitigation targets that it cannot meet. On the other hand, it has the opportunity to influence three of the most powerful countries in the world, and can use it for the global good.
   
   
4. Implications of various effort-sharing approaches for national carbon budgets and emission pathways (2019)
   The bottom-up approach of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in the Paris Agreement has led countries to self-determine their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets. The planned ‘ratcheting-up’ process, which aims to ensure that the NDCs comply with the overall goal of limiting global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C or even 1.5 °C, will most likely include some evaluation of ‘fairness’ of these reduction targets. In the literature, fairness has been discussed around equity principles, for which many different effort-sharing approaches have been proposed. In this research, we analysed how country-level emission targets and carbon budgets can be derived based on such criteria. We apply novel methods directly based on the global carbon budget, and, for comparison, more commonly used methods using GHG mitigation pathways. For both, we studied the following approaches: equal cumulative per capita emissions, contraction and convergence, grandfathering, greenhouse development rights and ability to pay. As the results critically depend on parameter settings, we used the wide authorship from a range of countries included in this paper to determine default settings and sensitivity analyses. Results show that effort-sharing approaches that (i) calculate required reduction targets in carbon budgets (relative to baseline budgets) and/or (ii) take into account historical emissions when determining carbon budgets can lead to (large) negative remaining carbon budgets for developed countries. This is the case for the equal cumulative per capita approach and especially the greenhouse development rights approach. Furthermore, for developed countries, all effort-sharing approaches except grandfathering lead to more stringent budgets than cost-optimal budgets, indicating that cost-optimal approaches do not lead to outcomes that can be regarded as fair according to most effort-sharing approaches.
   
   
   
   
5. Earth, Wind and Fire: Unpacking the Political, Economic and Security ...
   Förhandstitt av denna tjocka bok via GoogleBooks... hittade lite om Sydafrika: man antog 2008 LTMS - Long-term Mitigation Scenarios som undersöker landets olika alternativa utsläppsbanor...
   
   En rad olika faktorer redovisas som pekar på att man inte kommer att klara av att följa den utsläppsbana som krävs för klimatet. En kärnfaktor är landets ekonomiska fastlåsning i MEC - minerals-energy complex - som innebär att ekonomin och sysselsättningen är uppbyggd kring kolkraft och gruvindustri som producerar för export. Marknads- och lönsamhetstänkande verkar sätta begränsningar för möjligheten att ställa om till fossilfria alternativ, liksom forsknings- och utbildningssystemets inriktning av tradition att jobba med optimering av fossil energiteknik snarare än att satsa på utsläppsfri teknik.
   
   
6. Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development (IPCC SR15 Chapter 2)
   The Remaining 1.5°C Carbon Budget
   Carbon budget estimates Since the AR5, several approaches have been proposed to estimate carbon budgets compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C. Most of these approaches indirectly rely on the approximate linear relationship between peak global mean temperature and cumulative emissions of carbon (the transient climate response to cumulative emissions of carbon, TCRE), whereas others base their estimates on equilibrium climate sensitivity. The AR5 employed two approaches to determine carbon budgets. Working Group I (WGI) computed carbon budgets from 2011 onwards for various levels of warming relative to the 1861–1880 period using RCP8.5, whereas WGIII estimated their budgets from a set of available pathways that were assessed to have a >50% probability to exceed 1.5°C by mid-century, and return to 1.5°C or below in 2100 with greater than 66% probability. These differences made AR5 WGI and WGIII carbon budgets difficult to compare as they are calculated over different time periods, are derived from a different sets of multi-gas and aerosol emission scenarios, and use different concepts of carbon budgets (exceedance for WGI, avoidance for WGIII). Carbon budgets can be derived from CO2-only experiments as well as from multi-gas and aerosol scenarios. Some published estimates of carbon budgets compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C refer to budgets for CO 2-induced warming only, and hence do not take into account the contribution of non-CO 2 climate forcers.
   
   However, because the projected changes in non-CO2 climate forcers tend to amplify future warming, CO2-only carbon budgets overestimate the total net cumulative carbon emissions compatible with 1.5°C or 2°C. In contrast to the model-only estimates discussed above and employed in the AR5, this report additionally uses observations to inform its evaluation of the remaining carbon budget. Table 2.2 shows that the assessed range of remaining carbon budgets consistent with 1.5°C or 2°C is larger than the AR5 SYR estimate and is part way towards estimates constrained by recent observations. Figure 2.3 illustrates that the change since AR5 is, in very large part, due to the application of a more recent observed baseline to the historic temperature change and cumulative emissions; here adopting the baseline period of 2006– 2015. Although, as outlined below and in Table 2.2, considerably uncertainties remain, there is high agreement across various lines of evidence assessed in this report that the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C or 2°C would be larger than the estimates at the time of the AR5. However, the overall remaining budget for 2100 is assessed to be smaller than that derived from the recent observational-informed estimates, as Earth system feedbacks such as permafrost thawing reduce the budget applicable to centennial scales.
   
   
   
   
   
   Realizing the transformations towards a 1.5°C world would require a major shift in investment patterns. Literature on global climate change mitigation investments is relatively sparse, with most detailed literature having focused on 2°C pathways. Global energy-system investments in the year 2016 are estimated at approximately 1.7 trillion USD2010 (approximately 2.2% of global GDP and 10% of gross capital formation), of which 0.23 trillion USD2010 was for incremental end-use energy efficiency and the remainder for supply-side capacity installations. Studies suggest that annual supply-side investments by mid-century could be lowered by around 10% and in some cases up to 50% if strong policies to limit energy demand growth are successfully implemented. However, the degree to which these supply-side reductions would be partially offset by an increase in demand-side investments is unclear. Some trends are robust across scenarios (Figure 2.27). First, pursuing 1.5°C mitigation efforts requires a major reallocation of the investment portfolio, implying a financial system aligned to mitigation challenges. The path laid out by countries’ current NDCs until 2030 will not drive these structural changes; and despite increasing low-carbon investments in recent years, these are not yet aligned with 1.5°C. Second, additional annual average energy-related investments for the period 2016 to 2050 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C compared to the baseline (i.e., pathways without new climate policies beyond those in place today) are estimated by the models employed in McCollum et al. (2018) to be around 830 billion USD2010 (range of 150 billion to 1700 billion USD2010 across six models). This compares to total annual average energy supply investments in 1.5°C pathways of 1460 to 3510 billion USD2010 and total annual average energy demand investments of 640 to 910 billion USD2010 for the period 2016 to 2050. Total energyrelated investments increase by about 12% (range of 3% to 24%) in 1.5°C pathways relative to 2°C pathways. Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of six (range of factor of 4 to 10) by 2050 compared to 2015. Specifically, annual investments in low-carbon energy are projected to average 0.8–2.9 trillion USD2010 yr−1 globally to 2050 in 1.5°C pathways, overtaking fossil investments globally already by around 2025. The bulk of these investments are projected to be for clean electricity generation, particularly solar and wind power (0.09–1.0 trillion USD2010 yr−1 and 0.1–0.35 trillion USD2010 yr−1, respectively) as well as nuclear power (0.1–0.25 trillion USD2010 yr−1). Third, the precise apportioning of these investments depends on model assumptions and societal preferences related to mitigation strategies and policy choices (see Sections 2.1 and 2.3). Investments for electricity transmission and distribution and storage are also scaled up in 1.5°C pathways (0.3–1.3 trillion USD2010 yr−1), given their widespread electrification of the end-use sectors (see Section 2.4). Meanwhile, 1.5°C pathways see a reduction in annual investments for fossil-fuel extraction and unabated fossil electricity generation (to 0.3–0.85 trillion USD2010 yr−1 on average over the 2016–2050 period). Investments in unabated coal are halted by 2030 in most 1.5°C projections, while the literature is less conclusive for investments in unabated gas. This illustrates how mitigation strategies vary between models, but in the real world should be considered in terms of their societal desirability (see Section 2.5.3). Furthermore, some fossil investments made over the next few years – or those made in the last few – will likely need to be retired prior to fully recovering their capital investment or before the end of their operational lifetime. How the pace of the energy transition will be affected by such dynamics, namely with respect to politics and society, is not well captured by global IAMs at present. Modelling studies have, however, shown how the reliability of institutions influences investment risks and hence climate mitigation investment decisions, finding that a lack of regulatory credibility or policy commitment fails to stimulate low-carbon investments. Low-carbon supply-side investment needs are projected to be largest in OECD countries and those of developing Asia. The regional distribution of investments in 1.5°C pathways estimated by the multiple models in are the following (average over 2016–2050 timeframe):
   0.30–1.3 trillion USD2010 yr−1(ASIA),
   0.35–0.85 trillion USD2010 yr−1 (OECD),
   0.08–0.55 trillion USD2010 yr−1 (MAF),
   0.07–0.25 trillion USD2010 yr−1 (LAM),
   0.05–0.15 trillion USD2010 yr−1 (REF)
   (summerar till 0,85 - 3,1 med medelvärde 2,0)
   (Asia, OECD (OECD group of countries), Africa (MAF), Latin American (LAM) and reforming economies (REF)).
   
   Until now, IAM investment analyses of 1.5°C pathways have focused on middle-of-the-road socio-economic and technological development futures (SSP2). Consideration of a broader range of development futures would yield different outcomes in terms of the magnitudes of the projected investment levels.